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Case Comments
Decisions of International and Foreign Tribunals
MALCOLM W. MONROE,* Departmental Editor
France
Re Frechengues (Cour de Cassation, Criminal, 10/15/69), B. 252, pp.
605-607; 64 Am. Journal of International Law (July 1970) 715. Frechengues was arrested in Spain on December 28, 1967, was held in
custody there following a request by France for his extradition, and was
delivered to France on May 16, 1968, when he was placed in detention
pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a juge d'instruction (Examining
Magistrate) of Marseilles. After Frechengues' conviction, the Court of
Appeals of Aix-en-Provence fixed the date of his detention in France as
the date from which his period of detention should be measured in computing the time to be deducted from his sentence. Defendant filed a petition
(pourvoi en cassation) with the Cour de Cassation to annul the decision of
the lower court as violative of Articles 23 and 24 of the Penal Code for the
reason that the time of detention in Spain should have been recognized.
The court held that the "preventive detention" which Article 24 requires
be deducted from a sentence, is restricted to preconviction dentention
imposed pursuant to a warrant of committal or arrest issued by a juge
d'instruction; that since such warrants are only effective in France, the
period of detention for purposes of Article 24 is computed from the day of
incarceration (sic-but the Article uses the word "detention"); and that
steps taken by foreign authorities to assure his surrender to French authorities are not pre-conviction detention for which deduction must be made
from the sentence imposed.
United Kingdom
In re Al-Fin Corporation's Patent, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1405 (Chancery
*B.A. (1940) and LL.B (1942), Tulane University; partner, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stills,
New Orleans; member, American, Louisiana State, New Orleans, and Federal Bar Association, American Judicature Society and Maritime Law Association; president (1957-1959).
Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity.
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Div., 4/2/69); 64 Am. J. of International Law (July, 1970) 708. An American corporation sought a five-year extension of its patent under Section 24
of the Patents Act, 1949, contending that a shortage of nickel between
1950 and 1953 due to the Korean War had inhibited its full realization of
the potentialities of the patented invention. Having received an adverse
ruling from the comptroller's examiner on the basis of the comptroller's
earlier holding in Harshaw Chemical Co.'s Patent that the Korean conflict
did not constitute "hostilities between His Majesty and any foreign state"
(as provided in Section 24 of the Patents Act) because North Korea is not
recognized as a "foreign state," the company filed this action in the Chancery Division, seeking reversal of the decision in Harshaw, presumably
anticipating that such a result would dictate a favorable holding by the
chancellor in the instant matter.
The court overruled Harshaw, holding that the term "foreign state" as
used in Section 24 comprehended both recognized and unrecognized
states, if the latter comprises "a sufficiently defined area of territory over
which a foreign government has effective control," and that North Korea
met the conditions for a viable state. The court concluded that, accordingly, the applicants are entitled to proceed with the application for extension on that basis.
Atkinson vs United States of America Government, [1969] 3 W.L.R.
1074 (House of Lords, 11/5/69), 64 Am. J. of International Law (July
1970) 711. Atkinson had been arrested and charged with armed robbery
and attempted murder in Louisiana, and in a plea-bargaining session before
trial, he agreed to plead guilty to the charge of attempted armed robbery for
which he was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment, and the other
charges were dropped. He subsequently escaped from prison in Louisiana
and was thereafter arrested in England on a warrant which erroneously
stated that Atkinson had been convicted of armed robbery and attempted
murder. When it was shown that the actual conviction, and his breaking out
of prison, are not extraditable offenses under the 1931 Extradition Treaty
between the United Kingdom and the United States, the Louisiana authorities requested his extradition on charges of attempted murder and aggravated burglary. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ordered Atkinson committed for extradition on the charge of attempted murder, but declined to
commit on the charge of aggravated burglary on the ground that the offense
was essentially the same as the offense of attempted armed robbery, so that
the plea of autrefois convict is applicable. Atkinson applied to the Queen's
Bench Division for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that (i) he was not
"found" in the United Kingdom within the meaning of Article 1 of the
treaty because the charges set out in the extradition request had been
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I

Case Comments

191

dropped; (ii) those charges were being made for the purpose of acquiring
custody of his person so that he could be returned to prison; and (iii) the
District Attorney in New Orleans had indicated in his affidavit supporting
the request, that the fugitive would be returned to prison to complete his
sentence, a procedure which would violate the principle of specialty stated
in Article 7 of the treaty. The Divisional Court granted the United States'
appeal on the ground that the magistrate was not authorized to accept the
plea of autrefois convict, dismissed Atkinson's application for writ of
habeas corpus, and remitted to the magistrate with direction to commit on
the charge of aggravated burglary.
Atkinson appealed to the House of Lords, contending that to revive the
charge of attempted murder, dropped in the plea-bargaining process in
Louisiana, in order to obtain extradition, was "oppresive and contrary to
natural justice." Lord Reid held that, while extradition for the purpose of
compelling Atkinson to serve out his sentence, a non-extraditable offense,
would violate the treaty, if there is sufficient evidence to justify committal
on the charges of attempted murder, the magistrate may not refuse committal on the ground that the action would be oppressive or contrary to
natural justice. He pointed out that any question as to denial of natural
justice is to be resolved by the Secretary of State at his discretion. In
response to appellant's argument that he had not been "found" in the
United Kingdom, Lords Morris and Guest held that this term means only
that a fugitive must be present in the United Kingdom when the extradition
charges were preferred against him in the requesting state.
Royal Government of Greece vs Governor of Brixton Prison ex Parte
Kotronis, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1107 (House of Lords, 11/5/69); 64 Am. J. of
International Law (July 1970) 714. The extradition of Christos Kotronis, a
Greek national, was requested by Greece for the reason that he had been
convicted in Athens on a charge of obtaining money under false pretenses
and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. After the Bow Street Magistrates' Court ordered him committed to prison pending his surrender to
Greek authorities, Kotronis applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that he had been convicted in absentia, and that he had learned of
the proceeding some three years later while living in England. Reversing
the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, and rejecting Kotronis' contention that the Greek proceeding violates natural justice, the House of
Lords ordered Kotronis committed to prison pending extradition. Lord
Reid noted that while an English court may question whether a foreign civil
judgment violates natural justice, a different situation prevails with respect
to a foreign criminal judgment, and citing the Atkinson case, reiterated that
any question as to denial of natural justice in the matter will be resolved by
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
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the Secretary of State at his discretion. Also refusing to accept respondent's argument that as an opponent of the Greek Government, he would
be detained on political charges before or in lieu of serving the sentence on
the charge for which he was being extradited, the court said that would be
a clear breach of faith on the part of the Greek Government and it is
"impossible for our courts or your Lordships sitting judicially to assume
that any foreign Government with which Her Majesty's Government has
diplomatic relations may act in such a manner." Lord Morris of
Borth-y-Gent observed that"it is for the courts to say whether the statutory
conditions have been complied with to the extent that a fugitive criminal
could be surrendered; it is for the Secretary of State to decide whether,
having regard to all the circumstances, he should be surrendered."
India
State of West Bengal vs Jugal Kishore More and Another, 1969
S.C.W.R. 56-AIR 1969 S.C. 1171; 9 Indian J. of International Law (July
1969) 427. A non-bailable warrant for the arrest of More issued by the
Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, was forwarded by the Ministry of
External Affairs to the High Commissioner for India, Hong Kong, who in
his turn requested the Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong, for an order extraditing More under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, to India for trial for
offenses described in the warrant. The Central Magistrate, Hong Kong,
endorsed the warrant and directed the Hong Kong Police to arrest More,
which was done. More's father sought an order quashing the warrant of
arrest and all proceedings taken pursuant thereto. The High Court did so,
holding that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no power to issue the
warrant of arrest in the manner he had done and that there was no legal
basis for the requisition made by the Ministry of External Affairs to Hong
Kong for extradition of More. The High Court accordingly ordered that the
warrant against More and the subsequent proceedings be quashed. Appeal
was filed by the Government of West Bengal against the order of the High
Court.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It was first noted that the "law
relating to extradition between independent States is based on treaties. But
the law has operation national as well as international. It governs international relationship between the sovereign States which is secured by
treaty obligations. But whether an offender should be handed over pursuant
to requisition is determined by the domestic law of the State on which the
requisition is made. Though extradition is granted in implementation of the
international commitments of the state, the procedure to be followed by the
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Court in deciding whether extradition should be granted and on what
terms, is determined by the municipal law."
The Court held that the Indian Extradition Act of 1903, which provided
for the more convenient administration of the Extradition Acts of 1870 and
1873, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1881 (acts of the British Parliament), had been adopted in certain particulars by the President of India,
following India's becoming a Republic in 1950; that the Fugitive Offenders
Act, 1881, and the Extradition Act, 1870, in their application to India, had
not been repealed by the Indian Parliament and, by virtue of the India
(Consequential Provision) Act 1949, they remained applicable to the extent that they were consistent with the constitutional scheme. Since the
extradition followed the procedure recognized prior to January 26, 1950,
the extradition procedure was valid.
Further, while recognizing that the provisions of the Extradition Act,
1962, could not be availed of, in securing the presence of More in India for
trial, because Hong Kong is not included in the list of Commonwealth
countries from which extradition of fugitives may be secured under that
act, the court held that this did not bar the requisition made by the Ministry
of External Affairs if it was able to persuade the Colonial Secretary, Hong
Kong, to deliver More for trial in India and the Colonial Secretary was
willing to hand More over for trial in India.
Cipriano Negredo vs Union of India, AIR 1969 Goa, Daman & Diu 76;
9 Indian J. of International Law (July 1969) 434. Petitioner was employed
with T.A.I.P. (Air Transport Service of Portuguese India). Following the
acquisition of the territories comprised in Goa, Daman and Diu by the
Government of India, by military action, the services of the staff employed
by T.A.I.P. were terminated. The petitioner filed a writ under Article 226
of the Constitution of India to quash the order by which he was dismissed
from service and to require the Government to reinstate him.
The Court noted that it must first be determined "whether the winding
of T.A.I.P." and termination of the services of its staff was an "act of
State," which "tersely put ....
is an act which does not purport to be done
under colour of a legal title but in exercise of the sovereign authority in
external politics." And in Pema Chibar vs Union of India, AIR 1966 SC
442, it was held "that the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu had been
acquired by the Government of India from the Portuguese Government by
conquest, and if so the acquisition was necessarily in the nature of an 'act
of State.' "
The Court concluded that the "history of about 20 days following the
liberation of the territories makes it abundantly clear that T.A.I.P. was
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
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wound up and the services of its employees were terminated in exercise of
the right of the new sovereign and not pursuant to any legal authority and
as such there is no escape from the conclusion that both the acts, namely,
the closure of T.A.I.P. and the termination of the services of its employees,
were in the nature of 'acts of State.' "
Abdul Salam vs Union of India and Others, AIR 1969 All 223; 9
Indian J. of International Law (October 1969) 528. This was a second
appeal by Abdul Salam from a decree dismissing his suit for permanent
injunction to restrain the Union of India and the State of Uttar Pradesh
from deporting him to Pakistan. Appellant alleged that he was born in
Aligarh and domiciled there at the commencement of the Constitution of
India and is a citizen of India; that in March 1950 he had gone to Pakistan
temporarily because of fear of disturbances; and that he was compelled to
obtain a Pakistani passport in order to see his seriously ill father.
The Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try a suit asking
the Court to restrain the Government from deporting a plaintiff alleging
himself to be a citizen is not barred under S. 9(2) of the Act. "What is
barred is the permit of the Court to decide the question whether he has
acquired the citizenship of another country, provided this question arises in
the suit. If it does arise, the Civil Court cannot try the question itself. The
proper course for it would be to refer any question covered by S. 9(2) to
the Central Government and stay further hearing of suit till the decision of
the Central Government is received and then decide the suit in accordance
with law."
It was further held by the Court that "the power to decide the question
whether a person has acquired the citizenship of a foreign country is
quasi-judicial in nature," which "means that the authority must act judicially and must give a reasonable opportunity to the person affected by its
decision to rebut the presumption which may arise against him under
clause (i) of the Schedule I II of Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules."
Malkiat Singh vs State of Punjab, AIR 1969 Punj. 250; 9 India J. of
International Law (October 1969) 529. Petitioner, asserting that he is an
Indian citizen domiciled in Punjab, sought admission to the Medical College in Punjab, admission to which was restricted to persons domiciled in
Punjab. Admission was denied and this suit followed.
The Court held that "domicile" is "a synthesis of the factum [an indefinite, not purely fleeting, residence] and the animus [a present intention
to reside in the country where the residence has been taken up]." The
Court then quoted Lord Cranworth's observation that, "By 'domicile' we
mean home, the permanent home, and if you do not understand your
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permanent home, I am afraid that no illustrations drawn from foreign
writers will very much help you to it." Finding that petitioner's allegations
met the test, the petition was allowed.
Ahmadunnisa Begum vs Union of India, AIR 1969 A.P. 423; 9 India J.
of International Law (October 1969) 530. The daughter of the late General
His Exalted Highness Sir Mir Osman Alikhan, the former Ruler of Hyderabad State, brought this suit challenging the issuance of the certificate
by the Government of India to the grand-son of the late Nizam in recognition of his succession to the full ownership of the Nizam's property. It was
alleged that after the conclusion of the Merger (Accession) Agreement, the
late Nizam became a private citizen and that, inasmuch as he was a
Muslim of sunni sect, succession to his private property should be governed by his personal law, viz., Hanafi school of Muslim Law. The issue
before the court was "whether inheritance to the private property of a
Ruler is governed by the agreement or covenant entered into between the
Ruler and the Government of the Dominion of India."
The only reference in the agreement "is of a recognition of succession
according to law and custom to the gaddi of the State and to the personal
rights, privileges and dignities and titles of the late Nizam." The court then
stated:
,Personal' rights referred to in Article IV undoubtedly are personal rights
qua the Ruler. But rights to private property have nothing to do with succession to the gaddi. One person may as heir succeed to the private property and
another person may be recognized as an heir to the gaddi. With the former the
Government of India has no concern, while it has the power to recognize the
latter. It cannot be denied that by the very nature of the rights which the late
Nqzim had, to the full ownership, use, enjoyment and possession of his private
property, to deal with it as he liked, to gift it, to create a trust or charity, to
bequeath it by will to the extent he could under his personal law, are such that
the Government of India could not have been invited to exercise any power or
control over them.

Republic of China
Public Procuratorvs Ho Ch'lh-Nung, Wu-Ch'i-nien [1968] i tzu No.
8672 (District Court of Taipei, Taiwan, Aug. 22, 1968); 64 Am. J. International Law (July 1970) 708. Defendant, a seaman on the S.S.
Hsiang-yun, operated by the China Navigation Co., Ltd., jumped ship
when his vessel arrived at Baltimore, and was subsequently arrested by
United States immigration authorities and deported to the Republic of
China. He was tried by the District Court of Taipei on a charge of violating
an order issued by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) under Article I I of the
National General Mobilization Law, providing that a seaman who deserts
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his vessel abroad shall be punished for violating the National General
Mobilization Law. In considering the question of jurisdiction, the court
held that the defendant could be punished in accordance with the law of the
Republic of China because "an offense committed on board a vessel of the
Republic of China outside the territory of the Republic of China shall be
considered an offence committed within the territory of the Republic of
China."
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